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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
S T A T E OF U T A H , by and through 
its Road Commission, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
B E T T I L Y O N ' S , INC., and NOLAN 
OSWALD, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
S T A T E M E N T O F T H E K I N D O F CASE 
This is a condemnation action brought by the State 
of Utah, by and through its Road Commission, for 
the condemnation of 11 acres of ground located in Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, in the vicinity of Knud-
sen's corner (6200 South and Holladay Blvd.) 
1 
No. 
10277 
I 
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D I S P O S I T I O N I N L O W E R COURT 
This case was tried to a jury and a verdict for 
$130,000.00 was awarded to the Defendants. The De-
fendants appeal from this verdict. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants seek additional damages for cost of 
platting and planning of the original subdivision, for 
expenses incurred by Defendants during a 3 ^ year 
period, during which time Defendants were prevented 
by acts of the State Road Commission from making 
any use of their land, and for interest on the award 
from January 10, 1961. 
S T A T E M E N T O F F A C T S 
The land involved in this condemnation action is 
a 35.75 acre wooded tract (formerly the Auerbach 
Estate), located approximately 200 feet East and South 
of Knudsen's corner in Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah. Throughout this Appeal, the two Defendants 
and Appellants, Bettilyon's, Inc., and Nolan Oswald, 
shall be referred to collectively, as "Defendants" or, 
individually, as "Bettilyon" and "Oswald", and the 
Plaintiff, State of Utah, by and through its Road Com-
mission, shall be referred to as either "Plaintiff" or 
"Road Commission". 
2 
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While other Defendants are shown in various 
places in the caption of this action, the trial court de-
termined that the only parties who had any interest in 
the proceedings were Bettilyon's, Inc., and Nolan Os-
wald. 
On May 15, 1959, Commerce Investment Com-
pany, a Utah Corporation, (later merged into De-
fendant, Bettilyon's, Inc.), purchased 35.75 acres of 
ground under a Real Estate Contract (R 278, Ex-
hibit D 36), for $170,000.00, plus real estate commis-
sion. The purchase price was paid as follows: $10,000.00 
cash, plus commission; $23,402.00 by assuming a mort-
gage with Tracy-Collins Trust Company, and the 
balance of the purchase price, amounting to $136,598.00 
was paid in four annual installments on succeeding 
years. Interest was charged on the unpaid contract 
balance, at the rate of 4% per annum, commencing May 
15, 1959. Interest on the mortgage at Tracy-Collins 
Trust Company was charged at the rate of 5% per 
annum. The Real Estate Contract, at Paragraph 8 
(R 281), required the Buyer to "proceed forthwith" 
to develop the ground by the formation of a subdivi-
sion. The firm of Bush & Gudgell was immediately 
hired to proceed with the engineering and planning 
of the subdivision and on June 28, 1960, a Preliminary 
Subdivision Plat of the proposed Random Woods Sub-
division was presented to the Planning Commission 
of Salt Lake County (hereinafter referred to as "Plan-
ning Commission") and approved by this body (R 275, 
Exhibit D 29-2). 
3 
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J"*" 
( On December 8, 1960, the Road Commission took 
prfhe first of a series of steps designed to deprive De-
/ fendants of the beneficial use of their land, without 
compensation. Mr. C. Taylor Burton, Director of 
Highways, on this date wrote a letter to the Planning 
Director of the Salt Lake County Planning Com-
mission. We quote this letter in full because it clearly 
shows the plan the Highway Department consistently 
followed during the next 2 ^ years, to prevent any use 
of the property in the path of the freeway without 
regard to the rights of the owners (R 275, Exhibit 
D-29-5): 
"Utah State Department of Highways 
Salt Lake City 14, Utah 
December 8, 1960 
Mr. Morris E . Johnson 
Planning Director 
Salt Lake County Planning Commissoin 
355 South 200 East Street 
Salt Lake City 11, Utah 
Dear Mr. Johnson: 
In order that steps may be taken to protect 
the right-of-way needed for the construction of 
the southeast belt route this is to request the Salt 
Lake County Planning Commission to restrict 
further developments along this route as pro-
vided by law. The attached plan shows the align-
ment. 
A 400 ft. right-of-w$y is requested for res-
ervation at this time. This width would be modi-
fied as detailed right-of-way plans can be de-
veloped. This route has been approved by the 
4 
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Road Commission and it is anticipated that some 
right-of-way purchase may be undertaken within 
a year. Although actual date of construction is 
dependant upon availability of federal-aid funds 
there is some probability that actual construction 
may be started within two or three years. 
Your assistance in preserving this right-of-
way will be appreciated in the interest of keeping 
the public investment in this facility at a mini-
mum. 
Very truly yours, 
/ s / C. Taylor Burton 
Director of Highways 
J E J : i w 
Attachment:" 
(Emphasis added). 
In June of I960, Commerce Investment Company 
(prior to its merger with Bettilyon's, Inc.), sold an 
undivided one-half interest in the subject land to Nolan 
Oswald, the other Defendant. 
On December 13, 1960, Defendants presented the 
final linen plat (Exhibit D 6) of the proposed Random 
Woods Division to the Planning Commission and action 
was deferred until January 10, 1961. The minutes of 
this meeting, relating to this transaction, are as fol-
lows: (R 275, Exhibit D 29-6) : 
"Mr. Johnson pointed out that the State Road 
Commission has indicated they would put an 
interchange near or in the location of this sub-
division; that perhaps they will need all of this 
area for this purpose. Bush and Gudgell re-
quested that disposition be tabled until the next 
Planning Commission meeting. By motion sec-
5 
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onded and unanimously passed the Planning 
Commission tabled decision of Random Woods 
Subdivision, 6300 South 2900 East, until the 
next meeting, January 10, 1961." (Epmasis 
added). 
On December 20, 1960, Henry C. Helland, Chief 
Planning and Programming Engineer, Utah State 
Department of Highways, wrote a letter to the Plan-
ning Commission and the second and last paragraphs 
of this letter are quoted (R 275, Exhibit D 29-7): 
" I t is noted from the small zoning map en-
closed in your letter that the Random Woods 
Subdivision near Knudsen's Corner was given 
preliminary approval. The Belt Route location 
in this area would take a considerable portion 
of the northwest corner of this subdivision." 
"We are very much aware of the problems 
confronting the Commission and also realize that 
right-of-way costs are increasing daily. Because 
of this you can be assured that every effort will 
be made to expedite this work and furnish you 
with a map and legal description of the route 
at the earliest possible date in order that you may 
use whatever legal means available to you to 
protect the right-of-way from new building en-
croachments or other development." (Emphasis 
added). 
On January 10, 1961, at its regular meeting ,the 
Planning Commission denied approval of the Random 
Woods Subdivision final linen subdivision plat. The 
minutes of this meeting relating to this transaction are 
as follows (R 275, Exhibit D 29-9) : 
6 
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"Random Woods Subdivision, 6300 South 
2900 East, falls partially within the right-of-
way requested by the State Road Commission for 
the Belt Route. By motion seconded and unani-
mously passed the Planning Commission defer-
red approval of this final plat until one year from 
this date, with the understanding that should the 
State Department of Highways find before that 
date that all or part of this subdivision will not 
be needed for the Belt Route, the Planning Com-
mission would consider this subdivision, or parts 
thereof, for approval at that time." (Emphasis 
added). 
On January 16, 1961, in a letter to Roscoe Boden, 
County Surveyor, Mr. Douglas H . Campbell, Assistant 
Director of the Planning Commission, stated (R 275, 
Exhibit D 29-10): 
"The linen plat of Random Woods Subdivi-
son was considered for final approval at the 
Planning Commission meeting on January 10, 
1961. The Planning Commission has received 
plats of the proposed alignment of the Inter-
state Belt Roue with a request from the State 
Road Commission that this right-of-way be pro-
tected as much as possible." 
On November 15, 1961, Mr. C. Taylor Burton, 
Director of Highways, wrote to the Salt Lake County 
Commission, as follows (R 275, Exhibit D 29-11) : 
7 
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"Utah State Department of Highways 
Salt Lake City 14, Utah 
November 15, 1961 
Salt Lake County Commission 
City & County Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
S U B J E C T : Salt Lake Belt Route - 1-215 & 
1-415 
Gentlemen: 
Previously we advised you as to the tentative 
location of the Belt Highway in the Southeast 
quadrant and requested you to reserve this right-
of-way. Since that time, we have made definitive 
right-of-way plans which indicate the exact area 
required for the construction of the Belt Route. 
Attach find drawings showing the location of 
the Belt Route in the Southeast quadrant. 
It is requested that you zone the right-of-
way shown on the attached drawings to preclude 
the further construction in these areas. 
Very truly yours, 
/ s / C. Taylor Burton 
C. T A Y L O R B U R T O N 
Director of Highways 
Enclosure" 
(Emphasis added). 
This letter is quoted to show the continuing attitude 
of the Road Commission in attempting to preserve the 
right-of-way throughout the entire period covered by 
this matter. 
From the date of December 7, 1960 (the time the 
Planning Commission first indicated that the Random 
Woods Subdivision Plat would not be approved), to 
8 
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September 25, 1961, Mr. B. Lue Bettilyon, President 
of Bettilyon's, Inc., was i^^ffl^g^i- contact with offi-
cials of the Road Commission in an attempt to expedite 
matters, so that Plaintiff would be able to determine 
how much of Defendants' land would be required by 
the Road Commission (R 25 to 27), but it was not 
until February, 1962 (T 228), more than one year 
after the final linen plat was refused by the Planning 
Commission, that the Road Commission was able to 
present the first preliminary drawings (with tentative 
approval by the Bureau of Public Roads), of the inter-
change to be constructed on Defendants' ground. This 
was the first time that either Plaintiff or Defendants 
knew how much of the land would be required by the 
State. 
From October 26, 1961 to July 30, 1962, Mr. B. 
Lue Bettilyon was in contact with the officials of the 
Right-of-Way Department, in an attempt to get them 
to make an offer of settlement on the ground that was 
being taken by the Road Commission (R 27-29), but 
even as late as September 1, 1962, the State had not 
even made an offer for the purchase of this land that 
they would require. 
On July 30, 1962, Mr. B. Lue Bettilyon wrote 
a letter (R 16) to C. Taylor Burton, explaining that 
Defendants had payments to make on the ground in 
excess of $79,000.00 and requested the State to make 
a partial payment of $40,000.00 on the eventual pur-
chase of the ground. On September 4, 1962 (R 20 and 
9 
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29), the State made a partial payment of $40,000.00 
to Defendants. 
The State finally made its first offer on the land 
they were taking early in 1963 (T 241-2), more than 
two years after the Plenning Commission had refused 
to approve the final linen plat of Random Woods Sub-
division. 
Thereafter, the parties negotiated for approxi-
mately two months, but were unable to reach agree-
ment upon the price to be paid and, finally, to force 
the State to commence condemnation action, Defend-
ants appeared before the Planning Commission on May 
28, 1963, and requested approval of the final linen plat 
of Random Woods Subdivision. The minutes of this 
meeting (R 275, Exhibit D 29-16) show that the plat 
was approved and on July 22, 1963, the State finally 
served Summons and Complaint in this action. 
The land involved in this condemnation proceeding 
is quite heavily wooded with natural trees and, in one 
spot, a large old orchard. There are some open spots, 
as indicated on Exhibit D 4. Mr. B. Lue Bettilyon 
testified (T 171-2) that there was no use to which the 
ground could be used from January, 1961 to July, 
1963, except for subdivision purposes; that the homes 
were not suitable for rental; that the orchard was too 
old for farming and, in addition, that the ground could 
not be used for agricultural purposes because of the 
wooded nature of the ground and, also, because there 
was no irrigation water available for this use. 
10 
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In the planning and development of the Pre-
liminary and final Random Woods Subdivision Plats, 
Defendants incurred the following expenses (R 72 and 
R 31): $3,893.25 for engineering expenses (Bush & 
Gudgell and County Surveyor) ; $1,996.25 paid to 
employees of Bettilyon's, Inc., for work and labor on 
the planning of this subdivision (Note: the Findings 
of Fact (R 72) indicate $1,296.25, but the Exhibits 
at (R 300-303, Exhibit D 37) and the testimony of 
B. Lue Bettilyon at T 168-G, which was uncontro-
verted, indicates the total sum of $1,996.25) ; $160.02, 
signs for the subdivision roads and photos used in the 
planning and development of the subdivision—or a 
total of $6,049.52 spent in developing the final sub-
division linen plat. 
During the period of January 10, 1961 and July 
22, 1963, Defendants also incurred expenses caused 
by the delay of the State in preventing the development 
of the subdivision (R 300-301, Exhibit 37) and 
(Amendment Findings of Fact (R 71)) as follows: 
Real property taxes on property eventually taken by 
the State of Utah), $1,189.20; $200.00 for water con-
nection required to bring water into a Caretaker's 
house (if the subdivision had been developed, this ex-
pense would have been reimbursed by Salt Lake City); 
$904.90 for water bills from Salt Lake City for water 
used at the premises during the period mentioned above; 
(this expense would not have been incurred except for 
the delay) $178.00 required for the removal of a dead 
tree that was endangering neighbor's property. This 
11 
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tree would have been removed during the course of 
development of the subdivision by equipment already 
on the site, if the subdivision had proceeded according 
to plan, but subsequent windstorms required that it 
be removed at the expense indicated; $290.25 for fire 
insurance premiums on the buildings on the property, 
for a total of $2,762.35. 
In addition to the above expenses, Defendants paid 
$3,781.73 as interest to Tracy-Collins Trust Company 
on the mortgage on the property and the sum of 
$7,182.15 as interest to Security Title Company, on 
the unpaid balance on the purchase contract, or a tota] 
of $10,963.88 interest paid for the acquisition on the 
land and the interest computation on invested capital 
in the real property amounted to $18,329.07 (R 33-4 
and 73 A) and (R 302-303, Exhibit 37). 
In summary, on January 10, 1961, the Planning 
Commission denied approval of the final linen plat. 
2% years later, on July 22, 1963, the State filed this 
condemnation action and the final Order of Condemna-
tion was entered on August 31, 1964, making a total 
delay of more than 2 ^ years. 
S T A T E M E N T O F P O I N T S 
P O I N T I. T H E ACTS O F T H E S T A T E 
ROAD COMMISSION, I N R E Q U E S T I N G T H E 
P L A N N I N G COMMISSION O F S A L T L A K E 
COUNTY TO D E F E R A C T I O N ON T H E F I -
N A L L I N E N P L A T O F R A N D O M WOODS 
12 
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SUBDIVISION, CONSTITUTED A TAKING 
OF DEFENDANTS' P R O P E R T Y , F O R 
W H I C H COMPENSATION MUST BE PAID 
UNDER T H E F I F T H AND FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENTS TO T H E FEDERAL CON-
STITUTION, AND ARTICLE I, SECTIONS 
7 AND 22 OF T H E CONSTITUTION OF 
UTAH. INTEREST SHOULD HAVE BEEN 
PAID ON T H E JURY AWARD FROM JANU-
ARY 10, 1961, T H E DATE DEFENDANTS' 
PROPERTY WAS TAKEN BY T H E ROAD 
COMMISSION. 
POINT II . IN T H E EVENT THAT T H E 
COURT DOES NOT DETERMINE THAT 
T H E ACTS OF T H E PLAINTIFF , ROAD 
COMMISSION, BEFORE T H E PLANNING 
COMMISSION OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, IN 
DEFERRING ACTION ON T H E PROPOSED 
FINAL LINEN PLAT OF RANDOM WOODS 
SUBDIVISION WAS A TAKING OF DE-
FENDANTS' PROPERTY, THEN, IN THE 
ALTERNATIVE, DEFENDANTS ARE EN 
TITLED TO DAMAGES CAUSED BY THE 
PLAINTIFF, ROAD COMMISSION, IN PRE-
VENTING DEFENDANTS FROM USING 
THEIR PROPERTY FOR sy2 YEARS. 
POINT I I I . DEFENDANTS ARE EN-
TITLED TO T H E COST OF T H E ENGINEER-
ING, PLANNING AND DEVELOPING OF 
13 
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T H E FINAL LINEN PLAT OF RANDOM 
WOODS SUBDIVISION, AS T H E SAME CON-
STITUTES AN IMPROVEMENT TO T H E 
PROPERTY, UNDER 78-34-10 (1), U.C.A. 1953. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. T H E ACTS OF T H E STATE 
ROAD COMMISSION, IN REQUESTING T H E 
PLANNING COMMISSION OF SALT LAKE 
COUNTY TO D E F E R ACTION ON T H E FI-
NAL LINEN PLAT OF RANDOM WOODS 
SUBDIVISION, CONSTITUTED A TAKING 
OF DEFENDANTS' P R O P E R T Y , F O R 
W H I C H COMPENSATION MUST BE PAID 
UNDER T H E F I F T H AND FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENTS TO T H E FEDERAL CON-
STITUTION, AND ARTICLE I, SECTIONS 
7 AND 22 OF T H E CONSTITUTION OF 
UTAH. INTEREST SHOULD HAVE BEEN 
PAID ON T H E JURY AWARD FROM JANU-
ARY 10, 1961, T H E DATE DEFENDANTS' 
PROPERTY WAS TAKEN BY T H E ROAD 
COMMISSION. 
This case presents an unusual factual situation 
which, as far as we can determine, has not yet been 
presented to this Court. 
The Road Commission, in accomplishing its aims 
of keeping the cost of the Right-of-Way as low as pos-
14 
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sible, made use of a Salt Lake County Ordinance as 
amended, which provides in part: 9-7-3, Parks, School 
Sites and Other Public Spaces: 
"(1) Provisions for Public Use. 
When a preliminary plat is submitted for the 
division of property a part or all of which is 
deemed suitable by the Planning Commission 
for schools, parks, playgrounds, or other areas 
for public use, the Planning Commission shall 
apprise the proper agency in writing of the prop-
erty owner's intent to subdivide. If any such 
areas proposed for public use have not been 
freely dedicated to the public by the owner or 
have not been purchased at a fair price by the 
proper agency within one (1) year from the date 
of notification, such areas may be divided into 
lots and sold in accordance with the provisions 
of this Title." 
The letter of December 8, 1960, addressed to 
Morris E . Johnson, Planning Director, Salt Lake 
County Planning Commission, signed by C. Taylor 
Burton, the Chief Executive Officer of the Road Com-
mission, sets the stage and indicates the attitude of the 
Department of Highways, regarding the acquisition of 
Defendant's land. In this letter, Mr. Burton says: 
"Steps must be taken to protect the Right-of-Way" 
and requested that the Commission "restrict develop-
ment/' He asked that 400 feet be reserved, at that time, 
to be "modified" (narrowed) at a later time, and then, 
in the final paragraph, summarizes the position of the 
Road Commission: "Your assistance in preserving this 
15 
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Right-of-Way will be appreciated in the interest of 
keeping the public investment in this facility at a mini-
mum" (Emphasis added.) Several months later (on 
November 15, 1961), Mr. Burton stated, in a letter 
addressed to the Salt Lake County Commission: "Pre-
viously we advised you as to the tentative location of the 
Belt Highway in the Southeast quadrant and requested 
you to reserve this right-of-way" In the same letter, he 
requested: "that you zone the right-of-way shown on the 
attached drawings to preclude the further construction 
in these areas" (Emphasis added.) Other letters of a 
similar vein, were written by other officials of the Road 
Commission, as set out in the Statement of Facts. 
On January 10, 1961, the Planning Commission 
of Salt Lake County deferred action on the final linen 
plat of Random Woods Subdivision and this was done 
solely at the request and instance of the State Road 
Commission and the sole purpose was to prevent the 
property from being put to any benefiicial use by the 
landowner, by further development of a subdivision and 
to prevent construction of homes in the path of the free-
way and thereby to substantially reduce the cost of right-
of-way acquisition. 
In this respect, the testimony given at the trial, 
indicates that the acts of the Road Commission in stop-
ping the development of the Random Woods Sub-
division saved the State of Utah approximately $800,-
000.00. Exhibits D 7, 8, 9 and 10 indicate that approxi-
mately 20 lots in the proposed subdivision were taken 
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by the State for freeway purposes and homes having 
an average value of $40,000.00 would have been con-
structed on these lots over the 2% years prior to the 
commencement of the condemnation action (T 172). 
But even if, for the sake of argument, we say that only 
five or ten homes would have been constructed during 
that time, a tremendous savings was effected for the 
state. The value of one house is greatly in excess of the 
interest on the award that Defendants are claiming. 
In view of the already high cost of freeway con-
struction and limited funds available therefor, this was, 
and is, a worthy accomplishment (and we do not dis-
agree with the results) — so long as the rights of the 
individual are safeguarded and private property is not 
taken without compensation. 
Our point of view is expressed by this Court in the 
case of Springville Banking Co. vs. Burton, 10 Utah 
(2d), 100; 349 P(2d) 157 (at page 158) : 
"On the other hand, if public officials act arbi-
trarily and unreasonably, causing, for example, 
total destruction of the means to get in and out 
of one's property, without any reasonable justi-
fication for doing so in the public interest, in a 
manner that imposes a special burden on one 
not shared by the public generally, principles of 
equity no doubt could be invoked to prevent 
threatened action of such character or to remove 
any instrumentality born of such conduct. Plain-
tiff did not allege or assert anything akin there-
to." (Emphasis added). 
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There is little difference in the "total destruction 
of the means to get in and out of one's property," and 
the total prevention of any beneficial use of property, 
and there is no reason why one property owner should 
stand the entire burden that results in such an exceed-
ingly great savings for the public in general. 
The property in question (on January 10, 1961), 
as indicated in the Statement of Facts above, had only 
one use and that was for the development of a sub-
division. When the Defendants were deprived of that 
use, there was an effective definite taking of Defendants' 
property, on that date. 
The date of valuation of property in a condemna-
tion action is set by statute as the date on which Sum-
mons is served (78-34-11, UCA, 1953), which, in this 
case, was July 22, 1963. This Court has consistently 
held that interest is allowed on the Judgment, either 
from the date of taking or, if there is no taking, then 
from the date the final award is made (Oregon Short 
Line R. Co. vs. Jones, 29 Utah, 147; 80 P 732; State 
vs. Peek, 1 Utah (2d), 263; 265 P (2d), 630. 
In the instant case, the District Court allowed inter-
est from the date of Judgment, but Defendants have 
consistently maintained throughout this trial that on 
the date the County Planning Commission refused to 
approve the final linen plat of Random Woods Sub-
division, there was a taking of Defendants' property. 
Therefore, the issue to be resolved by this Court is: 
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What Constitutes a Taking and When Did the Taking 
Take Place in this Case? 
2 Nichols on Eminent Domain, page 367 (para-
graph 6.1(1)), states as follows: 
"It. is well settled that a taking of property 
within the meaning of the constitution may 
be accomplished without formally divesting 
the owner of his title to the property or of any 
interest therein. Any limitation on the free use 
and enjoyment of property constitutes a taking 
of property within the meaning of the constitu-
tional provision." (Emphasis added). 
Also, we read at page 372: 
"Constitutional rights rest on substance, not 
on form, and the liability to pay compensation 
for property taken cannot be evaded by leaving 
the title in the owner, while depriving him of the 
beneficial use of the property. I t has already been 
shown that a legal restriction upon the use of 
land may constitute a taking, although the title 
is unaffected and the land is physically un-
touched, and the same is true when the owner's 
enjoyment of the land is physically interfered 
with, although his legal rights remain unim-
paired." (Emphasis added). 
The U.S. Court of Claims, in the case of L. L. 
Richards vs. U.S., 282 Fed R (2) 901 (at page 904) 
in ruling on an invasion of Defendants' ground by 
raising the subterranean water table, stated: 
"We reiterate what we said in Cotton Land 
Co v. United States, 75 F . Supp. 232, 109 Ct. 
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CI. 816, that it is not necessary to show that the 
defendant intended to take plaintiff's land; all 
that plaintiff need show is that the taking of its 
land was the natural and probable consequence 
of the acts of the defendant. I t is not even neces-
sary for plaintiff to show that defendant was 
aware of the taking of an interest in its property 
would result from its acts. I t is only necessary 
to show that this was in fact the natural and 
J~s probable consequence of them, 
/^ "In the instant case it appears that defendant 
in fact knew that there would be seepage and 
an accumulation of water unless it was carried 
off in some way. The only thing defendant did 
not know was where it would accumulate. I t 
knew someone's land might be affected, but not 
whose. If it were necessary to show an intent— 
but it is not—an intent to commit acts that would 
probably result in the taking of some land jkas 
been shown. The particular land that might be 
taken was not within the control of defendant, 
but depended upon the laws of nature; but de-
fendant did contemplate the possible taking of 
an interest in that land to which the forces of 
nature directed the accumultaion of water caused 
by its acts. 
"We must hold that plaintiff's injury was the 
natural consequences of defendants act, and that 
the defendant has taken a seepage easement 
under and through plaintiffs3 property/' (Em-
phasis added). 
In case of Gerlach Livestock Co. vs. U.S., 76 F . 
Supp. 87 (at page 97), the Court quoted from the 
Supreme Court Decision in the case of Portsmouth 
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Harbor Land & Hotel Co. vs. United States, 260 U.S. 
327, 43 S.Ct. 135, 137, 67 L.Ed. 287, and says: 
"Plaintiffs (in the Portsmouth case) alleged 
that the Government had installed a battery and 
a fire control tower on lands to the rear of plain-
tiffs' lands, and that the guns from this battery 
could be fired only over plaintiffs' lands, and 
it was alleged that the defendant intended to do 
so at ^jill. The court said: 
< * * * If the United States, with the Ad-
mitted intent to fire across the claimants' land 
at will should fire a single shot or put a fire 
control upon the land, it well might be that the 
taking of a right would be complete. But even 
when, the intent thus to make use of the claim-
ants' property is not admitted, while a single act 
may r^ ot be enough, a continuance of them in 
sufficient number and for a sufficient time may 
prove it. Every successive trespass adds to the 
force of the evidence. The establishment of a 
fire control is an indication of an abiding pur-
pose.' 
"We think the reasoning behind this decision 
furnishes a guide for the determination of the 
time of the taking. That time, it would seem, 
comes whenever the defendant's intent to take 
has been definitely asserted and it begins to carry 
out that intent. So long as it is conjectural 
whether or not defendant will actually take plain-
tiff's property, a taking has not occurred, but 
when conjecture ripens into a definitely asserted 
purpose and steps are taken to carry out that 
purpose, the taking may be said to have occur 
red." (Emphasis added). 
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The effect of filing a map or a plan by governmental 
agency, under the ordinance referred to above, is dis-
cussed in 2 Nichols on Eminent Domain, 383, paragraph 
6.12, as follows: 
"The mapping out of streets upon vacant land 
near large and growing cities has often been 
provided for, so that a systematic plan for the 
gradual enlargement of the city can be followed. 
A mere provision that after the recording of 
the map no streets shall be laid out which are 
not in accordance therewith is unobjectionable; 
but it is sometimes enacted that if the owner 
builds upon the land marked out for a street, 
when the street is actually laid out he shall receive 
no compensation for his building. As the plat-
ting of a street under such a statute amounts 
substantially to a deprivation of the owner's use 
of the land within the limits of the projected 
street for any but temporary purposes, it is gen-
erally held that such statutes are unconstitu-
tional unless the owner is compensated for his 
loss/' (Emphasis added). 
At page 386 of the same volume, the author says: 
"The mere passage of legislation authorizing 
the acquisition of property by eminent domain 
is ordinarily not sufficient, in and of itself, to 
constitute a taking. Where, however, the provi-
sions of the statute and the circumstances under 
which the appropriation is to take place are such 
as to indicate that the purpose of the law was to 
effect a taking by virtue of the statute itself, it 
has been held that a statute may be so construed 
as to vest title in the condemnor upon the mere 
passage of the law" (Emphasis added). 
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The invoking of an ordinance such as the one 
quoted above, can have but one effect and one purpose 
and this is, to prevent and owner from enjoying the 
beneficial use of his property and, therefore, when used, 
clearly constitutes a taking of the property, which must 
be paid for under our Federal and State Constitutions. 
There are numerous cases that agree with this prin-
ciple, including our own Courts. One early Utah case 
is, Fisher, et al vs. Bountiful City, 21 Utah 29; 59 P 
520. In this case, the Legislature had passed a law 
giving a city the right to control water and water courses 
in the city, for city use. In the furtherance of this legis-
lation, the city had passed an ordinance to implement it, 
and thereby took over the control of water that was 
previously under the sole control of the Plaintiffs. The 
Court says: 
". . . Under Section 16, the city has the control 
of water and water courses leading to the city, 
and may regulate and control the same within 
the city, provided such control shall not be ex-
ercised to the injury of any right already ac-
quired by the actual owners. This provision was 
clearly intended to protect the owner in his right 
to water already acquired. The right referred 
to carried with it such authority and dominion 
as the owner then and formerly had to the full 
control, supervision and use of the water belong-
ing to him, without the exercise of the dominion, 
supervision, management, control, or the right 
to the distribution thereof by the city, or any 
other authority, except it emanated from the 
owner, it was a plain declaration that the right 
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to private property and private ownership of 
water should not be taken away from a citizen 
without just compensation, and that such right 
should be respected and protected in the owner. 
The right to own property carries with it the 
right to exercise dominion and control over it. 
When the dominion, control, and management 
of one's property is taken away from him, the 
right to private property is violated. To take 
away the dominion and control over property is 
to take the property itself; for the absolute right 
to property includes the right of dominion, con-
trol, and the management thereof/' (Emphasis 
added). 
A similar factual situation was ruled on by the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in the case of Miller, et 
ux, vs. City of Beaver Falls, 368 Pa 168; 82 Atlantic 
(2), 34, where the city laid out a plat for a park and 
provided that no buildings or structures that were con-
structed in a proposed park, during a three-year period, 
would receive compensation. In other words, the use 
of the land was frozen for a three-year period. The Court 
held that the act of plotting and freezing of the ground 
for three years was a taking, which would be in violation 
of the Pennsylvania Constitution and the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the Federal Constitution. The Court 
said, at page 37: 
"The action of the City of Beaver Falls in 
plotting this ground for a park or playground 
and freezing it for three years, is, in reality, a 
taking of property by possibility, contingency, 
blockade and subterfuge, in violation of the clear 
mandate of our Constitution that property can-
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not be taken or injured or applied to public use 
without just compensation having been first made 
and secured. The contention of the City in this 
case, if adopted, would make a travesty of the 
constitutional provisions protecting rights of 
property." 
In another case, Atton vs. City of Rochester, 197 
New York Supp (2d), 302, the City passed a Zoning 
Ordinance prohibiting the Plaintiff's land from being 
used for heavy industry. The evidence indicated that 
because of the location of the property, fronting on a 
River and because the area surrounding Plaintiff's prop-
erty was all used for heavy or commercial use, that the 
Palintiff was precluded from using the property for 
residential or hardly any other purpose, other than com-
mercial use. The Court stated (at page 306): 
"An ordinance which permanently so restricts 
the use of property that it cannot be used for 
any other reasonable purpose goes, it is plain, 
beyond regulation, and must be recognized as 
a taking of the property." 
I t is clear, from these cases, and numerous others, 
that the "taking" can be non-physical or constructive. 
This rule is cited in 2 Nichols on Eminent Domain, 
page 407, paragraph 6.3: 
"The modern and prevailing view is that any 
subtantial interference with private property 
which destroys or lessens its value, or by which 
the owner's right to its use or enjoyment is in 
any substantial degree abridged or destroyed, 
is, in fact and in law, a "taking" in the con-
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stitutional sense, to the extent of the damages 
suffered, even though the title and possession 
of the owner remains undisturbed." 
At page 409, the author says: 
" . . . The broader view, which now obtains 
generally, conceives property to be the interest 
of the owner in the thing owned, and the owner-
ship to afford the owner the rights of use, ex-
clusion and disposition. Under this broad con-
struction there need not be a physical taking 
of the property or even dispossession; any sub-
stantial interference with the elemental rights 
growing out of ownership of private property 
is considered a taking." 
In the Oregon Shortline R. Co. vs. Jones case, 
cited above, at page 734, Justice Straup gives an exhaus-
tive well-written opinion on the matter of payment of 
interest. In this case, apparently vacant ground was 
involved and Defendants claimed interest from the date 
Summons was served and the rule of law was set that 
has been consistently followed to the present time: That 
interest is paid only from the date of taking or date of 
entry of Judgment. Concerning the matter of an 
"actual" taking or a "constructive" taking, Justice 
Straup said: 
"In determining the claim to interest, much 
depends upon when, in the proceedings, the 
taking of the property took place. While the 
law is most exacting that private property shall 
not be taken without compensation, still the 
condemner is not required to make that com-
pensation until he does take, either actually or 
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constructively. The cases cited by appellants 
on what constitutes a taking are not pertinent 
to the matter of inquiry. In earlier times it was 
held that property could be deemed to be taken, 
within the meaning of constitutional provisions, 
only when the owner was wholly deprived of its 
possession, use, and occupation. But a more 
liberal doctrine has long been established, and 
an actual, physical taking of property is not 
necessary to entitle its owner to compensation. 
A man's property may be taken, within the 
meaning of constitutional provisions such as 
ours, although his title and possession remain 
undisturbed. To deprive him of the ordinary 
beneficial use and enjoyment of his property 
is, in law, equivalent to the taking of it, and 
is as much a taking as though the property it-
self were actually taken . . . The question as to 
whether appellants are entitled to compensation 
for property injuriously affected or damaged, 
though not actually occupied or to be occupied, 
as illustrated by the cases cited by them, does 
not here arise. And if it had arisen, such claim 
is conclusively answered in their favor by ex-
press terms in the Constitution and in the statute. 
The material point, therefore, here, is not, was 
there a taking? for such fact must be conceded 
by everyone, but, when did the taking occur? 
For it is with respect to the time of the taking 
that compensation, under the Constitution, must 
be made." 
In this case, Justice Straup is here discussing the 
question of the difference between "taking" and "dam-
age," as appears in the Utah Constitution, and the con-
struction of the word "taking" as it appears in the Fed-
eral Constitution, and some of the other State Constitu-
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tions (see the discussion on this subject appearing 
under Point I I below). But, clearly, this statement also 
has reference to the question involved in this case: 
"When Did the Taking Occur," and the fact there can 
be a "constructive taking" of property, without the 
governmental agency entering upon the land of the 
Defendants or disturbing their otherwise possessory 
right. 
The Oregon Shortline case is cited by a 1953 Utah 
Supreme Court case — State, by and through its Engi-
neering Commission, et al vs. Peek (cited above), where 
the Court upholds the same rule; that is, that interest is 
paid from date of taking or date of Judgment. 
In the opening statement, at page 632, after setting 
out the facts, the Court makes this broad statement: 
"Appellants are not entitled to interest on the 
Judgment prior to the time when actual posses-
sion was taken, this Court has uniformly so 
held." 
Then, the Court cites the Oregon Shortline case. 
While the words "actual possession" were used, we feel 
this was obiter dictum and is not binding upon this 
Court, since the matter of actual possession was not 
before the Court; the Defendants were asking interest 
from the date of service of Summons. 
In addition, to further illustrate this point, the 
opinion then goes on, at page 634, to quote from the 
Oregon Shortline case. These words are used: 
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"The court in that case conceded that property 
might be damaged by a public improvement al-
though not actually taken, in which case the 
owner would be entitled to damages, it being 
held that Section 3599 fixed "the time with ref-
erence to which compensation is to be computed, 
rather than fixing the time of the taking, or 
when the property shall be deemed to have been 
taken/' " (Emphasis added). 
I t is interesting and important to note and the rec-
ord is replete with evidence, that the Defendants fully 
cooperated with the State Road Commission with the 
aim of an early termination of the matter. I t was only 
after negotiations failed, after more than 2% years of 
waiting, that Defendants forced the issue, by having 
the subdivision plat approved (R 275, Exhibit D 29-
18), which act finally resulted in the State commencing 
this condemnation action. The Defendants cooperated 
with the State because they, as almost all citizens, are 
interested in the Road Building Program, and because 
they felt they would eventually be fairly compensated 
for the land taken by the State of Utah. 
There were other courses of action open to the 
Defendants. For example, they could have commenced 
an action to Mandamus the Salt Lake County Planning 
Commission to approve the final linen plat of Random 
Woods Subdivision, with the ultimate aim of testing 
the constitutionality of the County Ordinance, under 
which these acts were taken. However, under the calen-
dar of the District Court of Salt Lake County and the 
calendar of this Court, it would have been a minimum 
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of two years before a determination could have been 
made and, irrespective of the result, Defendants would 
have been in about the same position that they were in 
when the State finally filed Summons and Complaint. 
Also, under the interpretation of County Ordinance 
9-1-8(8) and 5-1-1 et seq., two building permits will be 
issued on a large tract of land before requiring a sub-
division to be approved and recorded. Therefore, in spite 
of the fact that the linen plat had been deferred for one 
year, Defendants could have obtained two building per-
mits and constructed two homes upon the land in the 
path of the freeway. This, certainly, would have been an 
act of bad faith but perfectly legal and, without ques-
tion, under the provisions of 78-34-11, UCA, 1953, 
Defendants would have been fully compensated for the 
reasonable value of such homes so constructed. 
In view of the extreme cost that has been incurred 
by Defendants, resulting from this delay, would this 
have been a proper action? We think not, nor do we feel 
that a Mandamus action with the resulting expense 
to the State, County and Defendants was necessary or 
the proper action. 
I t is a fair question to ask: Why the State Road 
Commission did not proceed in an orderly manner under 
the procedures set up by our statute (78-34-9, UCA, 
1963) for an Order of Occupancy? This would have 
stopped construction; it would have insured the reduced 
cost of acquisition of right-of-way; in fact, it would have 
accomplished all of the things set out by Mr. C. Taylor 
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Burton and other officials of the Road Commission in 
their various letters to the Planning Commission, but 
there are obvious reasons why the State did not use this 
judicial procedure. First, the State did not even know 
how much, if any, of Defendants' land was needed. 
Therefore, they could not describe, with certainty, the 
property to be taken as required under 78-34-6 and 9, 
UCA, 1953. Secondly, and more important in the eyes 
of the State Road Commission, they would have been 
obligated to pay for the land much sooner than they 
otherwise did, and there would have been no question as 
to the obligation of the State to pay interest from the 
date the Order of Immediate Occupancy was entered. 
All of these things were realized by the officials of the 
State Road Commission. 
Does the fact that the Road Commission chose to 
proceed under an Administrative Order of the Planning 
Commission of Salt Lake County, rather than seeking 
judicial authority vested in the District Court of Salt 
Lake County, change the factual situation? Does it 
change the legal rights or obligations involved? We see 
no difference and we add, by way of comparison, that 
even the status of the legal title under either of the two 
procedures, remains the same. Under the Order of Oc-
cupancy, the owner retains the fee title and loses his 
possessory right. Under the Administrative Order, the 
landowner loses the beneficial use of the property which, 
we submit, is only loss of possession, and the title is 
finally passed with the final Order of Condemnation 
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entered in this case. There is one other great distinction 
— if the Plaintiff had proceeded under the Complaint 
and Order of Occupancy, it would have been required to 
set forth, with particularity, the amount of Defendants' 
ground that it intended to use and, eventually, purchase. 
Under the Administrative Order, the State effectively 
tied up all of Defendants' ground for 2 ^ years, until 
it was finally determined how much would be required 
and, it is to be noted, Defendants are not now asking 
compensation for the delay caused by their being unable 
to use the balance of their land. 
There is one additional point that should be con-
sidered on this matter. On September 4, 1962 (R 20 
and 29), at the request of the Defendants, the State 
Road Commission made a partial payment to the De-
fendants, in the amount of $40,000.00. This was prior 
to any negotiation for the purchase and prior to any 
attempt being made to establish valuation. This clearly 
shows the attitude of the State Road Commission — 
that it had intended, by its acts, to deprive Defendants 
of the beneficial use of their property; that they had, 
in fact, taken the property and it was only a question 
of determining the purchase price to be paid therefor. 
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CONCLUSION 
From these facts and from the law cited, Defend-
ants feel that there can be only one conclusion — that 
the Plaintiff took Defendants' land on January 10, 
1961 and that interest should be computed from that 
date, on the award of $130,000.00 (less a credit for 
$40,000.00, paid on September 4, 1962), at the rate of 
6% per annum. 
P O I N T I I . IN T H E E V E N T T H A T T H E 
COURT D O E S NOT D E T E R M I N E T H A T 
T H E ACTS O F T H E P L A I N T I F F , ROAD 
COMMISSION, B E F O R E T H E P L A N N I N G 
COMMISSION O F SALT L A K E COUNTY, IN 
D E F E R R I N G ACTION ON T H E P R O P O S E D 
F I N A L L I N E N P L A T O F RANDOM WOODS 
SUBDIVISION W A S A T A K I N G O F D E -
F E N D A N T S ' P R O P E R T Y , T H E N , I N T H E 
A L T E R N A T I V E , D E F E N D A N T S A R E EN-
T I T L E D TO D A M A G E S C A U S E D BY T H E 
P L A I N T I F F , ROAD COMMISSION, I N P R E -
V E N T I N G D E F E N D A N T S F R O M U S I N G 
T H E I R P R O P E R T Y F O R sy2 Y E A R S . 
The District Court made a finding of fact (R 72-
74 A ) , listing the claims of the Defendants for damages 
caused by preventing Defendants use of the property 
for more than 3 % years. These damages consisted of 
interest paid on the contract and mortgage balances 
in the amount of $10,963.88; interest paid on capital 
invested in the purchase of the land, $18,349.07 (credit 
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was allowed for the $40,000.00 paid by the State); real 
property taxes paid by Defendants on the ground even-
tually taken by the State, in the amount of $1,189.20, 
and other miscellaneous items set out in the Findings 
and explained in the Statement of Facts, amounting 
to $1,608.25, for total damages amounting to $32,110.40. 
The Amended Conclusions of Law (R, 74 A-75) 
states: 
"3 . That such claims, as submitted, are sepa-
rate and independent causes of action unrelated 
to any issue of evaluation and damage com-
pensable in the eminent domain proceedings." 
This paragraph infers that the claims of the Defend-
ants are possibly valid and just, but that Defendants 
have no standing in this Court to adjudicate them. 
Article 1, Section 22, of the Utah Constitution 
states: 
"Private property shall not be taken or dam-
aged for public use without just compensation." 
In the case of State vs. District Court, Fourth 
Judicial District, 78 P ( 2 d ) , 502, Justice Wolfe, in the 
dissenting opinion, gives an exhaustive treatise on the 
meaning of the words "taken or damaged," as they 
appear in the section quoted above. The main opinion, 
in that case, has been overruled for all practical purposes 
(see Hjorth vs. Wittenburg, 121 Utah 324; 241 P (2d) 
907; State of Utah, by and through its Engineering 
Commission vs. Fred Tedesco, 4 Utah (2d) 31; 286 P 
(2d) 785; Springville Banking Co., vs. Burton (cited 
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above); Fairclough vs. Salt Lake County, 10 Utah 
(2d), 417; 354 P (2d) 105; State vs. Parker, 13 Utah 
(2d) 65; 368 P (2d) 585. For all intents and purposes, 
the dissenting opinion of Justice Wolfe, has been ac-
cepted in total by all of these later decisions. 
The holding of the dissenting opinion of Justice 
Wolfe and the later cases, cited above, can be sum-
marized as follows: When there is no actual taking of 
the landowner's property, but only damage (referred 
to by these cases as "consequential damage"), the State 
cannot be enjoined from proceeding with a project, nor 
can the State be sued for damages — the principle of 
sovereign immunity standing as a bar to these suits. 
The word "damaged" in this section of the Constitution, 
gives rise to a substantive right that is not self-execut-
ing; that is, does not give rise to a procedural right. 
This must be done by the Legislature, which has pro-
vided that in case of redress for consequential damage, 
application must be made to the Board of Examiners, 
as stated by Justice Wolfe, at page 522: 
" I conclude, therefore, that when the State 
is the real party which has caused damages in 
pursuit of its lawful business through one of its 
agencies not acting negligently, the sufferers 
of that damage must resort to the Board of Ex-
aminers for redress, and that such is due process 
under our Constitution and the Constitution of 
the United States." 
However, Justice Wolfe concludes his opinion with 
the following statement, at page 524: 
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"On the side of the line where acts done in 
pursuance of an authorized objective are not 
authorized, are all those cases which involve an 
actual taking of property. The State Road Com-
missioners do not act within their authorization 
when they attempt to build a road over my prop-
erty without acquiring it or arranging for com-
pensation. But, ordinarily, when they do not 
physically take any property, but only improve 
or build on the State's own highway, which is 
one of the purposes of their existence, they act 
within their authority, and any consequential 
damage which may incidentally occur or be 
caused by such acts does not divest them of 
authority. It is true that they may in some cases 
so raise a grade or build a viaduct or do some 
other act on the State's highway which, while 
not actually intruding on the property of an-
other, may cause such a serious interference wit]t 
the enjoyment of that abutting property as to 
amount to a 'taking3 . . . 
"Thus it is true that in the transition from con-
sequential damages to damages from actual 
trespass there may come a point before actual 
trespass where practically the entire usefulness 
of a building or lot is destroyed, as where a street 
is raised to a point practically contiguous to the 
upper window of a home. This has, as said before, 
caused the courts in the old cases where munici-
palities and public service corporations have used 
the streets to call a substantial injury to property 
a "taking" within the meaning of the condem-
nation statutes." (Emphasis added). 
This case presents a factual situation that falls 
within the rule cited by Justice Wolfe. Here, the State 
proceeded before an administrative body to stop De-
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fendants from proceeding with the development of their 
subdivision. There is, or was, no other use for which 
the ground could be used. These acts destroyed the 
entire usefulness of the property for 2 % years, until 
the State finally commenced condemnation proceedings 
and another year before these proceedings were com-
pleted, or a total of 3 % years. 
An analogy might be drawn to the factual situation 
set out in the State vs. Parker case, cited above. In that 
case, the Defendant attempted to Cross-Claim in a 
condemnation action against the State, for damages 
caused by the construction of a freeway to other prop-
erty not involved in that condemnation action. Justice 
Henriod stated, at page 587, ". . . on numerous occa-
sions, we have held that such damage is not recoverable 
because of the State's immunity," (citing the above 
cases). This is not the factual situation in this case. 
Here, damages were caused by acts of the State Road 
Commission to property owned by the landowner, which 
was later taken by this condemnation action. The acts 
were so severe that they amounted to an actual taking 
of the property, but more than 2% years pass before 
the State eventually files an eminent domain proceed-
ing. This is not a new or a separate cause of action, as 
in the Parker case, or as found by the District Court 
in the instant case, but damages arising out of the same 
cause of action; therefore, they cannot be considered as 
ancillary to, or a part of, any other proceeding. The 
State of Utah having waived its right to immunity by 
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filing a condemnation action, must pay for all damages 
arising out of the taking of this property. I t would not 
be reasonable to adjudicate only part of the damages 
before the Court and save a portion to be heard at a 
later time, before the Board of Examiners, even if we 
were to say that it were a separate cause of action where, 
as in this case, the acts amount to a "taking," this 
becomes a matter that can, and should, be adjudicated 
before the Courts and the Defendants cannot be told 
to take their claim to another body. This would create 
an unreasonable burden upon the landowner. 
Attention is also directed to the State vs. Tedesco 
case, cited above, where one of the property owners, not 
holding a vested interest in the real property, claimed 
damages for losses that he suffered. Here, Justice Hen-
riod again says (at page 789): 
"Since we hold that at best the defendant may 
have had a contract right in the development 
of prospective residential land, which, if carried 
out, would have enhanced the value of its land, 
such a claim cannot be made the basis for inter-
vention in a condemnation suit brought by the 
state against property in which defendant has 
no vested interest. This being so, the defendant 
could not sue the sovereign for the damages 
claimed here, and the State's defense of sove-
reign immunity is well taken in this case." 
In the instant case, however, Defendants had a 
vested interest in the property and were involved in a 
condemnation action solely concerning that property. 
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As stated in the Springville Banking Co. vs. Burton 
case, cited above, this "imposes a special burden on one 
not shared by the public generally. . . . " ; 
The Court in the case of State, by and through its 
Engineering Commission vs. Peek, cited above, recog-
nizes the possibility of a case of this nature where Justice 
Wade (at page 634) states: 
' 'Appellants further argue that failure to 
allow such interest constitutes a taking of private 
property for a public use without just compen-
sation, in violation of Article I, Sections 7 and 
22 of the Utah Constitution and the Fourteenth 
and Fifth Amendments to the Federal Consti-
tution. There are many cases which allow interest 
from the beginning of the condemnation pro-
ceedings even though the owner retains posses-
sion. Such cases require him to account for the 
income, rents and profits of the land during that 
period. Some of them cite the above mentioned 
Federal Constitutional provisions and State Con-
stitutional provisions similar to ours above cited 
in support of such holding. Some of such cases 
require a showing on the part of the land owner 
that he has been deprived of profits during the 
period in question which he would have made 
had the suit not been commenced, and that such 
profits were not included in the damages which 
were awarded. The record here does not show 
that such proof was made in this case." (Em-
phasis added). 
In this case, Defendants have not attempted to 
show profits since they would come only from the sale 
of lots in the subdivision over a period of time (although 
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such evidence was before the District Court, but not 
included in the record before this Court), because it 
might appear to be too speculative or remote. However, 
Defendants have approached this problem from the 
point of view of damages suffered in the nature of 
interest actually paid on the contract and mortgage 
balances, in the acquisition of the land, and interest paid 
on moneys invested, during the 3 ^ year total period 
that the Defendants were delayed, as well as the other 
expenses incurred by reason of this delay. These are 
realistic figures that can be computed (R 33-34; also, 
R 300 to 303, Exhibit D 37) and are not remote or 
speculative. These figures represent actual loss in dollars 
and cents to the Defendants. They represent a cost; an 
actual expenditure that Defendants would not have in-
curred if it were not for the acts of the Plaintiff. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, we respectfully submit that these 
damages represent a loss not included in the verdict of 
the jury — these items were never submitted to the jury 
and were not considered by them in arriving at their 
verdict. The Court refused to present them to the jury 
and at the special hearing, refused to allow these dam-
ages. If the Defendants are not awarded damages aris-
ing out of the acts of the Plaintiff, in depriving Defend-
ants of their property for such a long period of time, 
then the State has effectively taken their property with-
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out compensation, in violation of the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments to the Federal Constitution and 
Article I, Sections 7 and 22 of the Constitution of Utah, 
P O I N T I I I . D E F E N D A N T S A R E E N -
T I T L E D TO T H E COST OF T H E E N G I N E E R -
ING, P L A N N I N G A N D D E V E L O P I N G O F 
T H E F I N A L L I N E N P L A T OF RANDOM 
WOODS SUBDIVISION, AS T H E SAME CON-
S T I T U T E S AN I M P R O V E M E N T TO T H E 
P R O P E R T Y , U N D E R 78-34-10 (1), U.C.A. 1953. 
Our statute concerning the assessment of damages 
in a condemnation action, reads as follows (78-34-10) : 
"78-34-10. Compensation and damages—How 
assessed—The court, jury or referee must hear 
such legal evidence as may be offered by any 
of the parties to the proceedings, and thereupon, 
must ascertain and assess: 
(1) The value of the property sought to be 
condemned and all improvements thereon ap-
pertaining to the realty, and of each and every 
separate estate or interest therein; and if it 
consists of different parcels, the value of each 
parcel and of each estate or interest therein 
shall be separately assessed." (Emphasis 
added). 
The words "appertaining to the realty" has refer-
ence to any unpfovement Ji^Jjonging to or used in cqn-
riectioh witTTthe land. See Volume 3 A of Words and 
P&ases, page 378T 
The creation of a subdivision is an involved and 
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intricate process, requiring technical and artistic skills 
of a highly trained engineer, as well as the practical 
approach of saleability of the lots thus created, that is 
acquired by real estate developers only after years of 
experience. A subdivision is a special improvement that 
is planned and prepared for the particular land in ques-
tion and the completed product depends on numerous 
factors, viz., zoning, the development of the surrounding 
terrain, location of existing streets, canals, the slope of 
the terrain, trees, location of sewer and water, and the 
overall estimated cost of installing the off-site improve-
ments that become part of the subdivision. In this 
respect, it is as much appurtenant to the ground as a 
home or building and, in most cases, will be much more 
tailored to fit a particular piece of ground, than a build-
ing or a home. 
We have been unable to locate any cases, either for 
or against the proposition that a fully developed pro-
posed subdivision plat is appurtenant to the real prop-
erty, in the sense used by the above statute, but it 
seems, in analyzing the meaning of the word "appur-
tenant" and its use in this statute, that the final linen 
plat of Random Woods Subdivision became appurte-
nant by reason of the specialized nature of the final 
product. Therefore, the cost of creating the subdivision 
should be used as part of the value of the improvements 
to the land. 
Clearly, after the subdivision plat has been com-
pleted (and it makes no difference whether the plat has 
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3een recorded, or not) the ground has more value than 
it had prior to the creation of the subdivision. Because 
the prospective buyer realizes this is work he will not 
have to do, or expenses that he will not have to incur, 
it would, therefore, increase the value of the land; at 
least by the cost of the development of the subdivision 
plat and, in all likelihood, would increase the value con-
siderably more, because after the subdivision plat has 
been developed, the buyer is able to compute with more 
certainty the expenses of installing off-site improve-
ments, and he will be able to estimate with greater cer-
tainty, the value of the individual lots and his eventual 
profit or loss in the overall development. 
CONCLUSION 
We conclude, under these circumstances, that the 
terms "appertaining to the realty," refers to and includes 
the costs of developing a subdivision plat, and Defend-
ants should be awarded the sum of $6,049.52 as addi-
tional damages in this action. 
Respectfully submitted, 
KIRTON & BETTILYON 
VERDEN E. BETTILYON 
336 South Third East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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